Nuclear Security Culture: Models

So, let’s talk some about models associated
with culture, and, specifically, nuclear security culture. There is a model that is commonly
used called the Edgar Schein model. It’s actually rather old at this point, but the basic model
says that the way that cultures develop and occur or takes action within an organization
is based on these three basic structures, this foundation of underlying assumptions,
espoused values, and then artifacts. So, what those three things mean is: the underlying
assumptions are the basic beliefs that we have; the espoused values is how we then project
those beliefs to others, so the things that we might say; and then the artifacts are what
we see in the, let’s say, physical world based off of how we project those beliefs, so what
actions actually end up occurring based on those.
So, for a simplified model of this for an organization, you might look at the underlying
beliefs being things like the assumption of a credible threat, that that is widely shared
among all of the individuals in an organization. And your espoused values might include all
of the simple principles that you use to guide decisions and behavior, so how you might behave
off of that. For example, if you do believe there is a credible threat to your facility,
then one of your espoused values might be that every individual in an organization has
a responsibility to report any security infractions that they see occurring.
Those espoused values could then lead to various artifacts that could include improvements
in the overall security system. That’s a real outcome that we want is an effective overall
security system being achieved, but there could even be other, more specific artifacts
that you might see that might be changes in the behaviors of individuals and things like
that. If we then zoom into each of those, we see the detail on each of these areas.
So again the assumption is largely going to remain the same at the bottom. Our basic assumptions
are the same, but above that, simple principles that we guide our actions with include things
like: a leadership commitment to nuclear security,
that the leadership espouses its values to all the employees about the importance of
this; that honesty, integrity, and responsibility
are a key component of all employees; that we maintain good equipment condition,
and that includes things like, if I see poor equipment in the system, I point it out and
tell it to the security personnel, “Hey, that camera doesn’t look very good or doesn’t look
like it’s working. These detectors are being blocked by this door.” Those sorts of things;
a commitment to procedures, that we have certain procedures to follow. I follow those procedures
when I do my operations. If I don’t follow those procedures, then that says something
about your culture. If you say, “Well, yeah, I know those are the procedures as written,
but I don’t follow them. I do this other set of procedures when I conduct my operations;
and then a commitment to learning and improvement. That’s actually a major part of nuclear security
culture, this concept that we, as an organization and as a set of employees at a facility, are
continually going to learn and improve ourselves, and that will actually then create certain
artifacts that we will see, and those artifacts, in this slide, is grouped into two main groupings:
one over here that deals with the management systems, and then the other that deals with
behaviors within the facility, or within the individuals and the management within the
facility. So, if we zoom in on each of these, we can
see how the overall system is structured, where we have this basic assumption at the
bottom, and everything really is related to that basic assumption. If this basic assumption
is false-if the individuals in the facility do not believe there is a credible threat-then
all of the things above it will actually fall apart and won’t work.

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